There is nothing to “prove” here. None of this information is hidden. It’s very clearly spelled out in the readily-available differences info between the NG and Max. The change to the cutout switches is trivial at best- in the event of a stab runaway, you don’t necessarily want to reengage any part of the electric trim system early on, if at all (reasons below). This isn’t reporting, it’s just misinterpretation of facts used to piece together an article for the sake of piecing together an article.

Let me preface all this by saying that I'm type rated in the 737 and have flown both the NG and the MAX.

I'm growing very weary of the shit reporting on the Max issues by so-called "experts."

On the newer 737 MAX, according to documents reviewed by The Times, those two switches were changed to perform the same function – flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer.

This is fine. This is what you want to do when you have a runaway stab on a 737. If you suspect a stab runaway, it's probably the electric trim system doing it (regardless of whether MCAS is behind the runaway or not). The electric trim is driven by one electric motor, controlled either by the autopilot or by the yoke trim switches. If there is a runaway, it's one of those two control systems that is causing it, so you initially want to turn both of them off to stop the runaway. Later, after controlled flight is reestablished, you can try to figure out the source of the issue, but both must be initially turned off to stop the problem-- in this respect, the Max setup is actually better, because only one switch must be moved to disable all electric trim control, which is the first thing that needs to be done: Stop the runaway. Note that this is only part of the stab runaway procedure. There are several steps (even a few that have to be performed before disabling electric trim via the cutout) that must be followed quickly and correctly.

That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions – such as MCAS – without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.

Again, the pilots must turn off both functions initially. Since there is really no way to tell what is driving the runaway when it first starts, both systems must be disengaged and the airplane trimmed manually with the mechanical trim wheel/s.

He said if the company had maintained the switch design from the 737 NG, Boeing could have instructed pilots after the Lion Air crash last year to simply flip the “AUTO PILOT” switch to deactivate MCAS and continue flying with the normal trim buttons on the control wheel.

IMO, this is a complete bullshit statement. [EDIT] As pilots, we don't guess at the cause of the problem in a situation like this: All anyone knows for sure in this situation is that this is a runaway stabilizer-- it doesn't matter if it's the MCAS causing it or a dead mouse shorting between a couple of electrical terminals; the response is the same, and you don't get to pick and choose or guess at what's causing the problem. You follow the procedure, stop the runaway, and manually fly the airplane. Just assuming it's the MCAS causing the runaway and selecting the autopilot trim to "cutout" (if that even were an option) could actually make the situation worse if the MCAS isn't the cause of the runaway.

The MCAS is part of the Speed Trim Sytem (a system which has been on the 737 forever), which uses the autopilot control pathway to trim the airplane. MCAS is only armed when the autopilot is off and the flaps are retracted. I see where the author and Lemme are going with this, but they are still completely disregarding the fact that both pathways that control the trim motor must be disengaged as part of the stab runaway procedure. As a pilot, you don't care which control pathway is causing the issue, you just want to stop it so the runaway stops. You also don't want to necessarily reengage any part of the electric trim system at all if the system was previously malfunctioning, particularly when you're close to the ground.

He said that would have saved the Ethiopian Airlines plane and the 157 people on board.

Not necessarily. Saving the airplane and the lives on board would have been much more likely if the pilots had correctly and quickly followed the Runaway Stabilizer procedure.. THEY DIDN'T. The only part of the procedure they followed was selecting the center-pedestal switches to "Cutout," and it took them an unreasonable amount of time to to that, considering the altitude they had.. None of the other procedures (Autothrottle off, Autopilot Off [they actually attempted to engage the autopilot three times], Trim Manually [this was only attempted after far too much time had elapsed]), were performed.

After that crash, Boeing issued a directive calling for pilots to use the typical runaway stabilizer procedure to deal with MCAS in the event of a problem. Then pilots would be able to swivel the tail down manually by physically turning a control wheel that connects to the tail via cables.

But on the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the pilots appear to have recognized the errant MCAS problem and flipped the cutoff switches as described in the checklist. But then it appears that the pilots were unable to move the manual wheel, likely because the forces on the tail made it physically challenging to turn.

Correct, but manual trim has to be done per the procedure, and done relatively quickly after the event starts in order to keep those control loads from developing in the first place. Leaving the autothrottle on takes the pilot out of the loop and removes one method of manually controlling speed and direction of flight. The pilots have to be pilots in this situation, and prevent air loads from increasing to a point where trimming manually becomes difficult. They also have to know how to trim the airplane manually if it becomes difficult (there's a procedure for that as well).

The bottom of Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist seems to acknowledge the possibility of this physically challenging scenario. It suggests that the pilots can first use the electric trim to neutralize those potential forces before hitting the cutout switches.

True, but this is only an initial response. Those yoke switches will only override ("neutralize") a trim runaway (MCAS-induced or otherwise) for about 5 seconds. After that, they become inactive until released again. Systems knowledge is very important for the pilots in a situation like this.

Lemme said he’s surprised that Boeing made the change to take away the functionality that could have allowed the pilots to shut off MCAS without shutting off the electric switches at their thumbs.

The guy has a valid point, but getting to the point in time where the pilots could go about diagnosing what was causing the runaway in the first place and then doing systems checks to see if re-engaging the non-autopilot trim pathway (thumb switches) would be feasible or even safe takes a decent amount of time and requires that the pilots manually fly the airplane to a safe area and safe altitude first. Even if the switch functionality had been retained from the 737NG, using that functionality after a runaway event like this would not have been practical or even safe considering the phase of flight and altitude where the Ethiopian flight was operating. They needed to get that airplane under control manually, and they didn't take the necessary steps to do so quickly and effectively.

It might sound like I'm placing all blame for these crashes on the pilots. I'm not. I'm just pointing out errors in the way things were done that might have resulted in a different outcome if they'd been handled more-correctly. Boeing absolutely has to shoulder a huge portion of the blame in these instances for implementing the MCAS augmentation to the Speed Trim System in the way they did. Again, for clarity: The MCAS is basically just an add-on to a system that already existed in previous generations-- that system had capability of auto-trimming the airplane under certain conditions before MCAS was ever part of the picture.

This article is yet another example of a news source drumming up controversy just for the sake of keeping eyes on their feed, rather than conveying relevant and accurate information. [EDIT 4] To reiterate the point I'm trying to make because it seems to be lost in the noise: Would having separate switches for the autopilot and yoke trim channels have saved the crew in this particular point in time with this particular set of circumstances? Unlikely, considering the way they were operating, which is the whole point of my writeup. I'm not attacking the crew, I'm using available information about how the crew were performing (what they did or didn't do) to show that the whole subject of the article is speculative junk with little to no factual basis.

[EDIT 2] Thanks for the gold!!

[EDIT 3] See here for my response to this bit of self-fulfilling nonsense:

The guy below me is full of shit. He is literally just making up information. As someone who had read both reports, he has clearly not read either report and is simply making up information. The report states that the crews acted properly, the trim wheel was defective, and the MCAS overrode the pilots several times. His entire statement is untrue. Litterally every reason he just said is false or misleading. Stop encouraging this kind of behavior.

Jesus, Confirmation-Bias much? I guess next, you're going to try to convince us that your 5-day-old account where most of the posts are about Max news articles wasn't created solely to try to promote said articles.