https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137467](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137467). This link might not be working atm, but you can use the link for the Kerry Initiative which has tabs for the other attempts at peace.

At Camp David, Israel made a major concession by agreeing to give Palestinians sovereignty in some areas of East Jerusalem and by offering 92 percent of the West Bank for a Palestinian state (91 percent of the West Bank and 1 percent from a land swap). By proposing to divide sovereignty in Jerusalem, Barak went further than any previous Israeli leader.

Nevertheless, on some issues the Israeli proposal at Camp David was not forthcoming enough, while on others it omitted key components. On security, territory, and Jerusalem, elements of the Israeli offer at Camp David would have prevented the emergence of a sovereign, contiguous Palestinian state.

These flaws in the Israeli offer formed the basis of Palestinian objections. Israel demanded extensive security mechanisms, including three early warning stations in the West Bank and a demilitarized Palestinian state. Israel also wanted to retain control of the Jordan Valley to protect against an Arab invasion from the east via the new Palestinian state. Regardless of whether the Palestinians were accorded sovereignty in the valley, Israel planned to retain control of it for six to twenty-one years.

Three factors made Israel's territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the 91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers.

Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 sq. km near Latrun),41 post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 sq. km), and the territorial waters Of dead Sea (195 sq. km), which reduces the total to 5,538 sq. km.42 Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent (of 5,538 sq. km) of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective.

Second, at Camp David, key details related to the exchange of land were left unresolved. In principle, both Israel and the Palestinians agreed to land swaps where by the Palestinians would get some territory from pre-1967 Israel in ex-change for Israeli annexation of some land in the West Bank. In practice, Israel offered only the equivalent of 1 percent of the West Bank in exchange for its annexation of 9 percent. Nor could the Israelis and Palestinians agree on the territory that should be included in the land swaps. At Camp David, the Palestinians rejected the Halutza Sand region (78 sq. km) alongside the Gaza Strip, in part because they claimed that it was inferior in quality to the WestBank land they would be giving up to Israel.

Third, the Israeli territorial offer at Camp David was noncontiguous, breaking the West Bank into two, if not three, separate areas. At a minimum, as Barak has since confirmed, the Israeli offer broke the West Bank into two parts:"The Palestinians were promised a continuous piece of sovereign territory except for a razor-thin Israeli wedge running from Jerusalem through from [the Israeli settlement of] Maale Adumim to the Jordan River."44 The Palestinian negotiators and others have alleged that Israel included a second east-west salient in the northern West Bank (through the Israeli settlement of Ariel ..45 If true, the salient through Ariel would have cut the West Bank portion of the Palestinian state into three pieces".

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taba_Summit#:~:text=.%20...%22-,Reasons%20for%20impasse,for%20reelection%20in%20two%20weeks.

The 2001 Tabas talks were much more productive and the deal offer then was much better, but Barak's re-election was going terribly Arafat could have agreed to the deal and it might have saved Barak or he could have still lost and the incoming government may or may not have honored the deal and since the Likud party won I would say the chances of them honoring the deal would've been around 5%

https://www.inss.org.il/publication/annapolis/

The 2008 Annapolis talks failed due to outside forces rather than the deal that was presented which was quite fair and equal to both sides. The Israeli Prime Minister was on his way out due to corruption charges, the Bush administration policy decisions over the years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars hurt it's credibility and trustworthiness, and Abbas claimed that he didn't have enough time to study the map of the land swaps he would later say he should have taken the deal.

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/07/israeli-palestinian-peacemaking/kerry-initiative-2013-14

As part of Kerry’s initiative, there were to be confidence-building measures in support of the negotiations: Israel was to release Palestinian prisoners, in four tranches; and the Palestinians agreed to put on hold their proposed applications for membership of international bodies. But confidence-destroying measures also took place: Israel refused to release the fourth tranche of prisoners, and the expansion of settlements continued. In response to Israel’s failure to release the prisoners, Abbas signed letters seeking Palestine’s accession to 15 UN and other international bodies, a move that was followed in turn by Israeli measures against the PA.

According to Michael Herzog (who took part in the talks), the ground rules laid down by the US team were not clear; nor were the US’s messages, which the two sides understood differently. According to Herzog, the Kerry talks also undermined the secret, back-channel talks (the so-called ‘London track’) which were taking place in parallel and which were more likely to succeed.20 (A senior member of the Palestinian team in the back-channel talks has told the authors the same thing.)

Additionally Netanyahu insisted on the area in Israel known as the Triangle be part of the land swaps this area is home to the single largest population of Israeli Arabs which at the time was 300k out of 1.6 million.

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/netanyahu-rabin-and-the-assassination-that-shook-history/#:~:text=Assassination%20of%20Yitzhak%20Rabin%20%E2%80%A2,Israel%20Square%20in%20Tel%20Aviv.

The biggest or at least first major reason why peace talks were derailed has to be the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a ultranationalist Israeli Jewish man who was angered by the signing of the Oslo Accords. The far right in Israel and on the Palestinian side were both furious over the signing of the accords and each did what they could to undermine any future peace talks. After the assassination politics in Israel began to shift to the right and today at least for the time being the Likud party has control they have been the dominant party in Israel for the better part of the last 20 years.