The Islamic Republic’s New Lease on Life • How the Ս.S.-Israeli Strikes Empowered the Iranian Regime

Posted by Naurgul@reddit | anime_titties | View on Reddit | 152 comments

Israel’s June 13 assault on Iran, designed to decapitate Tehran’s military and nuclear program, is one of the worst setbacks the Islamic Republic has ever experienced. In less than two weeks, the Israel Defense Forces managed to assassinate dozens of senior Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists. The IDF destroyed many of Iran’s air defense systems and damaged its nuclear facilities. Israel bombed Iran’s energy infrastructure, military bases, and various missile production sites. The strikes were precise, indicating that Israeli intelligence had penetrated the highest levels of Iran’s armed forces and government. And toward the end of the attacks, the United States joined in. As a result, the Iranian military is weaker now than it was just a month earlier.

But instead of collapsing under the shock, the Islamic Republic appears to have gained a new lease on life. The strikes caused a rally-around-the-flag effect as Iranians condemned them and celebrated the government’s response. The Iranian regime mourned its lost officials but swiftly replaced them. The operations thus made the Iranian nation more cohesive and strengthened the hand of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iranian society is unlikely to become more rigidly Islamist in response to the strikes. To maintain internal stability, the government might even tolerate more social freedoms. But the regime will probably become more repressive, arresting anyone it sees as a traitor. And critically, Iranians may be more willing to accept the state as it is. The country could now have a new social contract, one that prioritizes national security above everything else.

Iran’s national security strategy, however, remains broadly unchanged. The Islamic Republic may be weaker in some ways, but its leaders are proud of having withstood the Israeli and American assaults. They see the substantial damage they inflicted on Israel’s cities as a major achievement. And they continue to believe that demonstrating resolve in the face of aggression is the only way to deter their opponents. Iranian leaders will thus set out to rebuild the country’s network of proxies: the so-called axis of resistance. They will trust diplomacy even less than before. Instead, they will lay the groundwork for a long war of attrition with Israel—and a potential nuclear breakout.

Israeli and U.S. officials are, of course, focused more on whether Tehran is a threat to them than whether it is a threat to its people. And after a year and a half of indirect and direct conflict, many of them believe the regime is nowhere near as menacing as it was before. According to these commentators, Iran’s aggressive Middle East strategy has been a failure, given the collapse of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad in Syria, and Hamas in Gaza—plus the damage to Iran’s own military.

The IRGC, however, sees the situation differently. Its leaders believe the country’s forward defense strategy—fighting adversaries by conducting asymmetric warfare near or within their borders rather than on Iranian soil—has been vindicated. This approach successfully deterred Israel and the United States from attacking for years and thus bought Tehran critical time to build up the industrial infrastructure, technical expertise, and institutional resilience it can now use to rapidly rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, even after the devastating bombings.

Still, Iran does not appear to be rushing toward the bomb. By crossing the nuclear threshold, Tehran would validate the very accusations it has long denied and risk triggering a larger conflict with U.S. forces. Iran also does not see nuclear weapons as a substitute for a strong conventional military. Instead of rushing for a bomb, Tehran will likely continue to pursue nuclear ambiguity, suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

That doesn’t mean Iran will eventually build a nuclear weapon. Whether or when the country will obtain the ultimate deterrent remains an open question. But what is clear is this: Iran is unbowed and unlikely to behave differently than it did before. That means Israel may decide to strike again. Iran could swiftly retaliate. The conflict between these parties is far from over, and the Middle East should expect more turbulence ahead.


Here is a copy of the rest of the article


Additional reading: