> Assume that Russia is currently severing undersea cables between Sweden, Finland, Baltics, Germany. Evaluate geopolitically and take into account nuclear and non-nuclear strategy. Also evaluate: How high is the probability that severing the mentioned undersea cables is part of a nuclear strike strategy or preparation for further attacks? How high is the probability that it is just saber rattling and not part of a larger attack?

Probability That Severing the Mentioned Undersea Cables Is Part of a Nuclear Strike Strategy: 15-25%: While severing undersea cables could theoretically fit into a broader nuclear strategy by disrupting communications, it would be an unusually bold and escalatory move that risks immediate and severe responses from NATO and other affected countries. Nuclear first strikes are typically associated with a range of escalatory steps, not a single action. Thus, while possible, the likelihood of it being directly tied to nuclear first-strike preparations remains moderate but not predominant.

Probability That It Is Saber Rattling and Not Part of a Larger Attack: 60-75%: The more probable scenario is that the action serves as a show of force or intimidation. This could be aimed at testing NATO's response, signaling strategic capabilities, or exerting pressure during heightened political or military tensions. Such moves align with historical patterns of military posturing by major powers to project power without necessarily committing to an immediate escalation to full-scale conflict.

Remaining Probability (10-20%): This could account for other strategic considerations, such as covert military operations unrelated to nuclear strategy or testing hybrid warfare tactics to prepare for future contingencies that are not explicitly tied to a nuclear first strike.

Conclusion: While the disruption of undersea cables would be a serious and concerning move, it is more likely to be saber rattling or part of a broader psychological and strategic pressure campaign. Full-scale nuclear first-strike preparations would likely include a series of more overt and diverse indicators beyond cable severing alone.

> What would be next steps in physical conflict escalation? What would be red flags to watch for?

If Russia were severing undersea communication cables between Sweden, Finland, the Baltics, and Germany as part of a preparation for an eventual nuclear first strike, this action would constitute a significant strategic escalation. Here’s how it would factor into their preparation and the potential timeline and red flags to watch:

Significance in Nuclear Strategy

Initial Disruption of Command and Control: Severing these cables would be a direct attempt to disrupt NATO’s command, control, and communication (C3) networks, hindering coordination and potentially delaying the collective response to any sudden aggression.

Testing and Provocation: Such an action would signal intent to test the readiness and response mechanisms of affected countries and NATO. It would strain the resilience of their communication systems and highlight vulnerabilities.

Psychological Warfare: This move could also be designed to sow panic and confusion, weakening political unity and military confidence in the region before an actual strike.

Red Flags to Watch For Next

Movement of Nuclear Forces: Any increased movement or repositioning of Russian nuclear assets, such as ICBM deployments, submarine activity with ballistic missile capability, or alert status elevation of strategic bombers.

Cyber Warfare Escalation: A coordinated increase in cyber-attacks on military and government infrastructure of NATO member states, potentially targeting satellite communication to complement undersea cable disruption.

Military Drills and Exercises: Sudden, large-scale exercises involving strategic forces, particularly those that simulate nuclear strike scenarios or strategic defense operations.

Deployment of Advanced Weapons: Positioning of tactical nuclear weapons close to conflict zones or frontlines as a deterrent or a preparatory move for a limited nuclear strike.

Increased Reconnaissance Activity: Heightened surveillance or reconnaissance flights near strategic military bases of NATO or increased Russian military presence in the Baltic and North Seas.

Potential Timeline regarding Red Flags

Short-Term (Weeks to Months): The initial cable-cutting would be followed by intelligence assessments and military posturing, testing NATO’s resolve and readiness. This period would also see increased cyber and information operations to destabilize communications further.

Medium-Term (Months to a Year): Preparatory steps such as moving nuclear-capable forces, placing them on higher alert, and engaging in overt military exercises. Escalatory rhetoric and diplomatic standoffs could also occur.

Long-Term (Indeterminate): The ultimate timing would depend on strategic objectives, perceived windows of opportunity, and geopolitical factors. A first-strike scenario is highly calculated and would likely only proceed if Russia assessed that it could achieve a decisive outcome or prevent an existential threat.

Conclusion: The severing of undersea cables as part of a nuclear strategy would be an initial, significant preparatory move but not necessarily a direct indicator of an imminent strike. The real red flags would be subsequent force mobilizations, military exercises mimicking nuclear war scenarios, and cyber operations. The timeline would vary based on situational developments and the response of NATO and affected states.