Well, sorry bud. They're not hostile attempts to trick you, they're teaching you to recognize a phish. And congrats, you apparently know how to recognize them.
I know phishing training always gets a ton of shit and called useless but man, getting hit with a phish isn't a one-in-a-million occurrence. They happen every day in every company, whether you yourself get them or not. I think something like 20% of breaches started with a phish and someone clicking something they weren't supposed to from the last report I read? Don't quote me on that.

There's plenty of tooling and filters you can throw in to reduce the number of obvious phishing attempts, but some will always slip through and that end user is the last line of defense (aside from the obvious controls and hardening policies you should have in place that blocks macros, suspicious executables, installs, etc.).
And that last line of defense needs to understand it's not always "CLicK HER3 TO CLAiM UR PRIZE" that you'd expect anyone to have at least a hair of common sense to detect (which somehow people still don't).
It's fake docusign emails, fake encrypted emails, fake employee handbook reviews or notices of pay changes from an email that looks like it came from your HR but it has an l instead of a I in the address. Those "Click here to sign and approve your raise" emails are really cruel to see and demoralizing, but I quite literally had an actual phishing campaign use that exact method against my company, but our filter caught it. I still try not to use those templates for campaigns though cause that's still pretty fucked.

And hell, legit phishes even come from legit addresses and locations, like Dropbox and Microsoft. Just this year I had an incident where 2 users received an email from someone under one of our clients sharing a file from their sharepoint for download. Legit address, legit email, legit Microsoft. They've done business with this very person before too, but they were not expecting any files from them, there was no context to the file, and they've never shared/accessed documents through Microsoft with this person. Legit, but still suspicious.
One person recognized all those signs and reported it so we could check it out, the other signed in and tried to download it to their computer. Turns out the client had been compromised and tried to spread that malware to everyone beneath that person's address book. I then proceeded to see that exact method used on a weekly basis through SharePoint, OneDrive, OneNote, etc.

Another user received a "court document" for review on our legal team from a spoofed law firm. It led to a fake Microsoft sign-in page that was indistinguishable from a real one aside from the URL. The user kept trying to sign into it, but it kept telling them their password was wrong. So they forwarded it to their manager and asked if they could access it. Not even five minutes later and I'm getting hits from Entra that her account was getting signed into in like 8 different locations AND they even accepted the MFA push they got for them, so that was another piece of training that needed covering.

The morale bit can always be addressed though.
Personally, our failure trainings are literally a minute and a half long, like a reminder or touch-up outside of the full annual trainings, and the only thing public about it is having your manager notified if you refuse to do it or just notoriously fail every single one. Every quarter we do drawings for the top reporters and reward them, so we have a pretty high report rate and positive attitude towards it.
And depending on the simulation service you use, you could even adjust the frequency settings for campaigns off click frequency, so maybe constant clickers get them twice a month while low risk non-clickers get them once.
Or basing it off risk level from the user's position. Like the VP is more likely to receive legit phishing emails than the custodian, so they need to understand they have a higher risk level so there is higher prioritization in their training.